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NOTES 
Conflicts of Interest and the Changing Concept of Marriage: 
The Congressional Compromise 
The number of women, including married women, 1 seeking 
prominent positions in American business and government has in-
creased rapidly in recent years, 2 and this development raises serious 
questions regarding potential conflicts of interest between spouses 
who work either in related areas of the public and private sectors 
or solely within the public sector. Specifically, when one spouse is 
a member of Congress, conflicts of interest can occur if the other 
spouse occupies a high-level position in private industry3 or in the 
executive branch of the government.4 This Note examines the 
potential dangers in these employment arrangements of members of 
Congress and their spouses to determine whether special constraints 
are warranted to combat potential conflicts of interest. 5 In so doing 
1. Increasing numbers of married women are seeking employment. See The 
American Family: Can It Survive Today's Shocks?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
Oct. 27, 1975, at 30 [hereinafter cited as The American Family]. 
2. During the nation's formative years, few women held influential roles in gov-
ernment. 1 E. JAMES, NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN, 1607-1950, at xviii-xxii (1974). 
No women held seats in the First (1789-1791), Twentieth (1827-1829), Fortieth 
(1867-1869), or Sixtieth (1907-1909) Congresses, and only eight women, all in 
the House, were members of the Eightieth Congress (1947-1949). Despite increased 
political activity by women, they are still a small minority in Congress. The Ninety-
third Congress (1973-1975) included fourteen women, and the Ninety-fifth Congress 
(1977) has eighteen. At least one source contends that women still are "barely 
represented in the public life of the nation." CENTER FOR THE AMERICAN WOMAN 
AND POLITICS, WOMEN IN PUBLIC OFFICE xix (1976). 
3. For example, in January 1976, Marion Javits resigned from a lucrative position 
with an advertising agency for which she handled the account of the government-
owned airline of Iran. Her action was apparently in response to concerns raised 
by the press about potential conflicts of interest between her employment and the 
position of her husband, Sen. Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.), the ranking Republican on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 6. 
4. For example, Elizabeth Hanford Dole, wife of Sen. Robert Dole (R.-Kan.), 
is a member of the Federal Trade Commission. Commissioner Dole has stated that 
she perceives no conflict of interest in this arrangement. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1976, 
§ 1, at 48, col. 1. However, Rep. John E. Moss (D.-Cal.), Chairman of the House 
Commerce Oversight Committee, and Rep. Joe L. Evins (D.-Tenn.), Chairman of 
the House Small Business Committee, called on Commissioner ·Dole either to resign 
from the Commission or to refrain from participating in her husband's 1976 vice-
presidential campaign. [1976] .ANTimuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 782 at 
A-5. In a speech on the floor of the House, Rep. Evins stated, "I am sympathetic 
with Mrs. Dole to the situation confronting her-loyalty to her husband or loyalty 
to the Commission." Id. at A-6. 
5. It should be noted that, although this Note specifically deals only with con-
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it scrutinizes the degree to which our society views marital part-
ners as autonomous, the interests protected by current conflict-of-
interest regulations, and the extent to which the rigor of general con-
flict provisions has been mitigated with respect to the marital relation-
ship. Concluding that safeguards against conflicts of interest are 
necessary in husband-wife employment situations involving a mem-
ber of Congress, the Note examines the possible forms such regula-
tion could take and recommends the creation of an independent 
ethics commission. 
I. THE AMERICAN CoNCEPT OF MARRIAGE 
The effort to determine the present societal view on the degree 
of autonomy of spouses6 is aided by a brief examination of the his-
torical evolution of the marital relationship. At English common 
law, unmarried women, although subject to some unequal treatment, 
had property and contractual rights almost coextensive with those of 
men. 7 It was the rite of marriage that resulted in the loss of many 
rights and privileges for the woman. 8 Because the English common 
flicts of interest occurring where one spouse is a member of Congress, similar con-
cerns arise from other situations in which at least one spouse is employed by the 
federal, state, or local government. Thus, many of the conclusions presented in this 
Note also may be applicable to those situations. 
6. Marriage is certainly a very personal relati9nship, and thus its nature varies 
greatly among couples depending upon the perceptions of the individual participants, 
Indeed, the institution of marriage is under attack as individuals attempt to redesign 
the relationship to reflect better the equality of the partners. See Note, Interspousal 
Contracts: The Potential for Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK L. REV. 185 
(1975). This situation is epitomized by the attempts to define the marital relation-
ship in contractual terms that are designed to permit the marriage to take any 
form permissible under contract law. See generally id. 
The many combinations that could emanate from this scheme create problems 
in defining "marriage." Although Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971), 
affirmed the state power to regulate certain facets of marriage, "it should be borne 
in mind that marriages are, and will continue to be, based more on personal relation-
ships than upon laws." Lexcen, The Equal Rights Amendment, 31 FED. B.J. 247, 
253 (1972). 
Furthermore, in attempting to discover the current American view on the inde-
pendence of partners in marriage, it must be recognized that there is no federal policy 
regarding marriage. In United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966), the Su-
preme Court recognized that the regulation of marriage is generally reserved to the 
states and cautioned against the imposition of any federal regulation unless a "fed-
eral interest" exists that "justifies invading the peculiarly local jurisdiction of these 
States, in disregard of their laws." 382 U.S. at 353. Moreover, the Court found 
interstate differences in the regulation of marriage to be products of "important and 
carefully evolved state arrangements designed to serve multiple purposes." 382 U.S. 
at 353. Yazell reveals the enormous difficulty in identifying a national legal concept 
of marriage. Such matters have been left to the discretion of the states, which have 
developed a variety of differing concepts of the relationship. As a result, there is 
a need for qualification of any conclusions about a national concept of marriage. 
7. See L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAw 35 (1969), 
8, L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 35. For example; after marriage the husband 
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law was generally adopted in the territories that later became 
the United States, 9 marriage converted American women of the late 
eighteenth century into "legal cipher[s]."1° For example, the 
doctrine of coverture resulted in numerous disabilities for married 
women with respect to their property. At marriage the husband 
could assume managerial control of the wife's real property with no 
duty to account for any rent or other income.11 A married woman 
thus generally lost the power to convey her land. 12 Most "tangible 
personalty" held by a woman ai marriage instantly became her hus-
band's property, as did any personalty that later came into her 
possession during the marriage.13 Under curtesy principles, if a 
child was born of the marriage, the husband received a life estate 
in all of his wife's realty obtained prior to or during the marriage.14 
Beginning in 1839, all states enacted statutes that somewhat 
.ameliorated the common-law limitations on a married woman's legal 
rights.15 These laws generally allowed her to manage and control 
property held by her prior to the marriage.16 The attempts at change 
often met with fierce opposition, 17 and the victory for the rights of 
married women was by no means absolute. Many of the statutes were 
enacted in piecemeal fashion over extended periods of time and as a 
result were not comprehensive.18 Furthermore, courts often strictly 
took control of all the wife's personal property, he gained considerable power over 
the disposition of her real property, and she lost the ability to make contracts. H. 
CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 7.1, at 219-20 (1968). For a further outline 
of British common-law disabilities, see P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 758-61 (P. Webb 
ed. 1974); w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF, ENGLISH LAW 520-33 (3d ed. 1923). 
The woman's subservient role in the marital relationship is also proclaimed in the 
Old Testament, where she is viewed as a piece of property comparable to the man's 
house or oxen. See Exodus 20:17. 
9. See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law 
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 
1058 (1972). 
10. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1046. It is probable that even in the late 
eighteenth century a married American woman had virtually no independence from 
her husband. Id. at 1059. Statements on this point must be tentative because of 
the dearth of reliable research. Id. at 1057-58. Marriage imposed on the husband 
certain obligations such as support and dower and made him liable for the wife's 
torts, but it did not directly constrain him. See L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 36-37. 
11. L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 36. 
12. Id. The husband could convey only his interest in the property (known as 
jure uxoris), which entitled him to sole possession and control during the marriage. 
Johnston, supra note 9, at 1045. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Note, The Impact of Michigan's Common-Law Disabilities of Coverture on 
Married Women's Access to Credit, 14 MICH. L. REv. 76, 79 (1975). 
16. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 7, at 40. 
17. See Johnston, supra note 9, at 1063-67. 
18, See id, 
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construed the legislation to limit greatly any effects in derogation of 
common-law principles.19 Generally, however, the pre-1900 legisla-
tive .activity featured, as one court put it, "unjust rules slowly 
giv[ing] way before advancing civilization."20 The gradual recogni-
tion of the property rights of the married woman is now widely 
viewed as virtually complete, 21 and this development might suggest 
a general acceptance of the .autonomy of each partner in the marital 
relationship. 
A similar process of gradual reform has given the married 
woman the right to contract, 22 including the ability to obtain credit 
independent of her husband, 23 and the right to retain separately 
any income she earns during the marriage. 24 In other areas, how-
ever, the trend toward autonomy has not been completed. For in-
stance, there is a long-standing custom that a woman will assume 
her husband's surname after marriage. 25 Although this convention 
does not affect the woman's legal or financial status, it stands as a 
symbol of the wife's lack of separate identity from her husband and 
might therefore be viewed as an extension of common-law coverture 
policies. Despite a growing number of deviations, 26 the legal en-
19. See, e.g., Heacock v. Heacock, 108 Iowa 540, 541, 79 N.W. 353, 354 (1899). 
20. Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N.Y. 299, 303 (1882). One rule that proved to be 
highly resistant to change was the restriction on a married woman's power to convey 
her own land. In 1913, twenty states required the involvement of the husband in 
such real-property transactions, and eight states still followed the rule in 1935. John-
ston, supra note 9, at 1078. Today only Alabama retains the rule. ALA. CODE 
§ 30-4-12 (1977). For a relatively recent application of the statute, see Daniel v. 
Haggins, 286 Ala. 409, 240 So. 2d 660 (1970). 
21. See H. CLARK, supra note 8, § 7.2, at 222-23. 
22. A decreasing number of jurisdictions retain common-law provisions limiting 
the right of a married woman to contract or to conduct a business. In 1935 sixteen 
jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii), thirteen of 
which were non-community property jurisdictions, restricted the contracting ability 
of married women. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1076. At the same time, eleven 
states, seven of which were non-community property jurisdictions, placed restrictions 
on a married woman's ability to engage in business. Id. By 1965, twelve states, 
seven of which were non-community property states, still limited the ability of mar-
ried women to contract. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 351 (1966). As of 
1972, there were still nine states with such restrictions, Johnston, supra note 9, at 1076 
n.179, despite the Supreme Court view that tlie principles supporting these con-
straints are "peculiar" and "obsolete." 382 U.S. at 351. 
23. See Note, supra note 15, at 77. 
24. It appears that by 1943 all non-community property states recognized this 
right. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1070. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that married 
women have no enforceable right against their husbands for the value of their labor 
in domestic activities. 
25. See L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 41. 
26. Iowa, for example, once did not allow a married woman to retain her maiden 
name, even through use of the state's name-changing process. IOWA CODE ANN. § 
674.1 (West 1947). This restriction has since been removed. See IowA CoDB § 
674.1 (1975). 
State courts in Ohio and Maryland have held that their state common law does 
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forcement of this tradition clearly retains some vitality.27 A similar 
reluctance to change traditional views of the marital relationship 
characterizes the law of support28 and the legal presumption that 
spouses share a common domicile. 29 
Much of the rationale for the disabilities imposed on married 
women is found in legal theory based on the Biblical notion that 
spouses are "one flesh."30 Marriage was seen as the union of man 
not require a woman to assume her husband's name. State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 
114 Ohio App. 497, 117 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elec-
tions, 226 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972). 
21. See Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (1971). A 
United States district court found that an Alabama requirement that a woman 
"assume her husband's surname upon marriage has a rational basis and seeks to con-
trol an area where the state has a legitimate interest." Forbush v. Wallace, 341 
F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971). This ruling was affirmed without opinion 
by the Supreme Court. 405 U.S. 970 (1972). The Sixth Circuit relied on For-
bush to affirm an unwritten Kentucky requirement that a married woman use her 
husband's surname in applying for a driver's license despite a showing that for all 
other purposes the woman had continued to use her maiden name. Whitlow v. 
Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). 
28. At common law, one of the few compensations the wife received in exchange 
for the legal disabilities she incurred through marriage was the guaranteed financial 
support of her husband. Johnston, supra note 9, at 1046. It is still the general 
rule that the primary obligation for family support rests on the husband. L. KANo-
wrrz, supra note 7, at 69-70. Although some states assert a wifely duty to support 
the husband under certain circumstances, see id., such as when the husband is poor 
or disabled, see id. at 69 nn.219 & 220, these provisions are not meant to create 
egalitarianism in the marital relationship. This legal philosophy regarding the hus-
band's financial duty, expressed most often in alimony determinations, reflects a view 
that marriage relationships are asymmetrical. So long as there is discrimination 
against women in the job market and substantial numbers of traditional marriages 
exist, there are practical justifications for this policy. 
It should be noted that "duty to support" laws may restrict the freedom to use 
interspousal contracts to redefine marriage. See Note, Marriage as Contract: To-
ward a Functional Redefinition of the Marital Status, 9 COLOM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 
607, 619 ( 1973 ). See generally Note, supra note 6. 
29. The statutes or common law of many states have perpetuated the idea that 
a married woman assumed the domicile of her husband irrespective of her own 
wishes. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 21, Comment a 
(1971). See also Landry v. Landry, 192 So. 2d 237, 239 (La. Ct. App. 1966): "It 
is too well settled to require citation of authority that a married woman can have 
no other domicile than that of her husband except in those cases where the husband's 
misconduct compels or justifies her in leaving him and establishing a separate domi-
cile elsewhere." 
There has recently been increased recognition that the wife may acquire a sep-
arate domicile if special circumstances make it unreasonable for husband and wife 
to share the same home. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 
21, Comment d (1971). Nevertheless, courts generally follow the presumption that 
a husband and wife share a common domicile, although some are reducing the stan-
dards for rebutting that presumption. For example, in Ashmore v. Ashmore, 251 
So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. dismissed, 256 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1972), 
the court held that, based on the dictates of "common sense," a woman could retain 
her own domicile. The wife's forced acceptance of the husband's domicile has also 
been modified in some states. See Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradi-
tion and Change, 62 CALIF. L. RBv. 1169, 1177 (1974). 
30. Genesis 2:22-23. 
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and woman into one "person," legally recognizable as the man.31 
One curious result of this concept is the doctrine that a married 
couple cannot be guilty of conspiracy between themselves because 
they are legally a single entity.32 
The Supreme Court has indicated that it is dissatisfied with the 
perception of a married couple as one "person." In Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,38 which involved a ban on the distribution of contraceptives, 
the Court stated that a married couple "is not an independent entity 
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individu-
als each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. "M In 
United States v. Dege,35 involving a criminal conspiracy, the Court, 
in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, stated that it refused "to be 
obfuscated by medieval views regarding the legal status of woman 
and the common law's reflection of them."86 Justice Frankfurter 
found the assertion that "a wife must be presumed to act under the 
coercive influence of her husband" to imply "a view of American 
womanhood offensive to the ethos of our society,"37 and he asserted 
that the legal submission of wife to husband no longer existed. 88 
Similar recognition of the independence of spouses has also occurred 
in state cases. 39 There thus seems to be a clear judicial preference 
31. 1 w. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *441-43. Several variations on this the-
ory exist. Some commentators explain that the husband is the wife's guardian, cast-
ing the male as the "protector" of his wife.- See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 406, 414 (2d ed. 1898). Others have viewed mar-
riage as a contractual relationship in which the husband's protection and support 
are tendered in return for the general services of the wife. See Johnston, supra note 
9, at 1047-48. Under a male-dominance theory, some have seen married women 
as properly subject to the control of their husbands. See M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 524 (1936). This theory holds that one partner 
must lead-and the man is better groomed for that role. J. BENTHAM, Principles 
of the Civil Code, in 1 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355-56 (J. Bowring ed. 1838). 
32. W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, CRIMINAL LAW § 62, at 490 (1972). The doctrine 
of interspousal-conspiracy immunity has been rejected in at least four states-Califor-
nia [People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 395 P.2d 893 (1964)]; 
Colorado [Dalton v. People, 68 Colo. 44, 189 P. 37 (1920)]; 111inois [People v. 
Martin, 4 Ill. 2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954)]; and Texas [Marks v. State, 144 Tex. 
Crim. 509, 164 S.W.2d 690 (1942)]-and in the federal courts in United States v. 
Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960). Several jurisdictions, however, still accept the doctrine. 
L. KANowrrz, supra note 7, at 87. 
33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
34. 405 U.S. at 453. 
35. 364 U.S. 51 (1960). 
36. 364 U.S. at 52. 
37. 364 U.S. at 53. 
38. 364 U.S. at 54. This development is not recent: Justice Holmes' opinion 
for the Court in Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (19'14), rejected the 
marital unity doctrine. 
39. See, e.g., Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1971): 
So it is that the unity concept of marriage has in a large part given way 
to the partner concept whereby a married woman stands as an equal to her 
husband in the eyes of the law. By giving the wife a separate equal existence, 
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that only minimal impairment of marital partners' autonomy should 
exist. 
Several current governmental policies create a special status for 
marital partners. 40 The taxation structure of the Internal Revenue 
Code differentiates between married and single persons. 41 This dis-
tinction presumably exemplifies Congress' view that financial inter-
dependence is a part of marriage and warrants different treatment 
by the taxation statutes. 42 Assistance programs of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare sometimes have assumed that a 
family is dependent on the earning ability of the male, with the female 
cast in a stereotypical "mother's" role. · Guidelines for the develop-
ment of state assistance plans under Title IV of the Social Security 
Act43 have in recent years expressed concern about the proper certifi-
cation of "unemployed fathers"44 and have assumed that the "mother 
or caretaker relative" is to make the choices about certain types of 
child care. 45 A statutory presumption that spouses are highly inter-
dependent can also be found in the laws governing some state assist-
ance programs. 46 Similar role stereotypes have been prevalent in 
other governmental programs as well. 47 
the law created a new interest in the wife which should not be left unprotected 
by the courts. Medieval concepts which have no justification in our present 
society should be rejected. 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has rejected the "assumption that a wife 
invariably acts under the compulsion of her husband, particularly in view of the ad-
vanced status of married wom1;1n." People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 881-82, 395 
P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845, 84r (1964) (Traynor, C.J.). Chief Justice Tray-
nor, with tongue in cheek, observed that the "fictional unity of husband and wife 
has been substantially vitiated by the overwhelming evidence that one plus one adds 
up to two, even in twogetherness." 61 Cal. at 880, 395 P.2d at 894, 40 Cal. Rptr. 
at 846. 
40. H ratified, the Equal Rights Amendment may alter many governmental poli-
cies, but many of the ramifications for marital partners are not yet known. See 
generally Lexcen, supra note 6. 
41. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1, 141. 
42. For example, the system of joint returns allows married couples in common-
law states to pay the same low rates already permitted for couples in community 
property states, where state law reflected this concept of shared income within the 
marital unit. See B. BrITKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsrATE, AND GIFI' TAXA-
TION 346-48 (4th ed. 1972). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V 1975), especially 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(v). 
44. 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(b)(5) (1975). See note 45 infra. 
45. 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(b)(4)(i) (1975). However, 45 C.F.R. § 220.35 in its 
entirety has been removed, effective March 16, 1976, as announced in 40 Fed. Reg. 
43,182 (1975). It was superseded by 45 C.F.R. § 224 (1975). See 40 Fed. Reg. 
45,819 & 47,688 (1975). 
46. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(a)(l) (CUm. Supp. 1976). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(l)(D) (1970) conditioned a widower's receipt of Old 
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits on proof that he received 
at least one-half of his support from his spouse prior to her death. A widow, how-
ever, was not required to provide such proof. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. 
V 1975). Noting that this scheme of benefit distribution was in part based on a 
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There are, of course, limits to the usefulness of measuring so-
ciety's view of a subject by reference to its laws. First, there is 
nearly always a "time lag" between the point at which a societal 
trend develops and the point at which the legislature responds to it. 
Second, because current trends tend to regard the marital relation-
ship as being jointly designed by largely independent marital part-
ners, 48 it may be that the subject does not lend itself to specific 
legislative action. In any event, commentators have differed on 
whether the law has kept pace with the rapid evolution of the socie-
tal concept of marriage. 49 The only safe statement is that the cur-
rent trend is toward greater independence of each marital partner 
presumption that wives are usually dependent, the Supreme Court struck down this 
regulation in Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977). The Court said that 
"[t]he only conceivable justification for writing the presumption of wives' depend-
ency into the statute" was based on assumptions that "do not suffice to justify a 
gender-based discrimination in the distribution of employment-related benefits." 97 
S. Ct. at 1032. 
48. See Johnston, supra note 9, at 1072. 
49. One contemporary source states that "[m]arriage bonds are loosening under 
the strains of bro;id social and economic shifts in the nation at large-among them 
the quest of women for equality in the home and 'fulfillment' in outside careers." 
The American Family, supra note 1, at 30. H. CLARK, supra note 8, § 7.2, at 223, 
also notes these trends, citing nonlegal materials such as B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININB 
MYSTIQUE (1963); s. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953); and M. MEAD, MALE 
AND FEMALE (1955). 
Opinions differ on whether contemporary laws reflect this changing societal view 
of marriage. A task force on family law and policy has stated that the laws of 
the United States hold marriage to be a partnership in which each spouse makes 
a different but equally important contribution. Report of the Task Force on Family 
Law and Policy to the Citizens' Advisory Committee on the Status of Women 
(1968), reprinted in WOMEN AND TIIE "EQUAL RIGHTS" AMENDMENT 408 (C. Stimp-
son ed. 1972). Other commentators, however, have maintained that the laws have 
failed to keep pace with the status of women in society. One writer noted that 
[t]he succinct comment of the 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration-''He has made 
her, if married, in the eye of the law civilly dead"[-]still has weight when 
applied to such matters as division of property after marriage, restrictions on 
use of a woman's maiden name, choice of legal residence, etc. Such discrim-
inatory laws have deprived women of equal status in a number of ways. 
I. MURPHY, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 15 (1973) (footnote 
omitted). This viewpoint was reiterated in a resolution adopted by the National 
Organization of Women (NOW): 
Whereas, woman's position in society rises no higher than woman's position in 
the marital relationship, and 
Whereas, it is within the home and family that children first learn sex-role and 
identity from observation and training, and it is in the family that long-range 
changes must be initiated, if there ever is to be equal partnership of men and 
women in society, and 
Whereas, marriages are based on unwritten contracts, many of which fail to 
insure equality of the marriage partners, and 
Whereas, many of the inequities we are combatting in employment, education, 
etc. are based on the inequalities existent in the marriage relationship, 
Therefore, be it resolved 
That, NOW sets as one of its highest priorities in 1974-75 equality in the mar-
riage relationship. 
Do IT Now, October 1974, at 8. 
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and greater equality in the marriage. It seems that, if this trend 
should reach the status of a societal goal, the chances are good that 
it will thereafter be reflected in the laws of the nation. 
II. THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Conflict of interest regulation is designed to identify and prevent 
the occurrence of those situations conducive to improper decision-
making by public officials. Such situations are commonly considered 
to exist when the public official 
finds it difficult if not impossible to devote himself with complete 
energy, loyalty, and singleness of purpose to the general public 
interest. The advantage that he seeks is something over and above 
the salary, the experience, the chance to serve the people, and the 
public esteem that he gains from public office. 50 
A further purpose of regulation is to prevent situations from arising 
that increase the appearance of likely impropriety. 51 
Although it is fairly easy to define "conflict of interest" in the 
abstract, identifying conflicts in specific situations is more difficult. 52 
Nevertheless, there is steady political pressure at various governmen-
tal levels for increased scrutiny and regulation of possible improprie-
ties. 53 In determining whether husband-wife employment combina-
tions require regulation, it is necessary to analogize from existing 
constraints on conflicts, since detailed attention has not been given to 
the marriage partner-conflicting employment problem. In so doing 
one must first identify the public interests promoted by such policies. 
A. The Doctrine of Incompatible Offices 
Perhaps the most specific conflict of interest doctrine provides 
50. MINN. GOVERNOR'S CoMMN. ON Ennes IN GOVERNMENT, Ennes IN GOVERN-
MENT 17 (1959). 
51. See Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 HARV. L. RBv. 1209 
(1963). 
52. See 70 W. VA. L RBv. 400, 400 (1968), which states: "In describing a 'con-
flict of interest' one is faced with a very difficult task. Much like 'sin,' few can 
define a conflict of interest, yet all are against it." Recently, executive and legislative 
bodies of government have been primarily responsible for developing definitions of 
conflict of interest. 
53. In the early 1960s, Professor Bayless Manning saw conflict of interest con-
siderations as a major concern of American society: 
Conflicts of interest have become a modern political obsession in this coun-
try, first, because American politics is highly susceptible to morality escalation 
and, second, because we are living in an era of unparallelled honesty in public 
administration when we can afford the luxury of worrying about public harms 
before they happen. 
Manning, The Purity Potlatch: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest, American Gov-
ernment, and Moral Escalation, 24 FED. B.J. 239, 248 (1964). Public concern with 
morality in government and with conflicts of interest in particular has continued 
unabated. See Freilich & Larson, Conflicts of Interest: A Model Statutory Proposal 
for the Regulation of Municipal Transactions, 38 U.M.K.C.L REv. 373, 374 (1970). 
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that it is improper for one person to hold simultaneously two public 
offices deemed to be "incompatible."54 Although traditionally the 
doctrine has been applied only when the two positions were held 
by the same person, its underlying rationale arguably would extend 
to a husband and wife holding the positions, at least if the spouses 
were viewed as an entity. Under federal law, article I of the Constitu-
tion recognizes the doctrine by including the prohibition that "no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a 
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."65 This 
provision reflects four basic concerns of the framers. First, they 
feared that if officials held state and federal office simultaneously 
the inevitable preference for one or the other would create a threat 
to federalism. 56 Second, the fundamental concept of separation of 
Politicians as well as political groups and commentators have expressed concern 
over conflicts of interest. President Kennedy, in an April 1961 message to Congress, 
stated: 
No responsibility of government is more fundamental than the responsibility 
of maintaining the highest standards of ethical behavior by those who conduct 
the public business. There can be no dissent from the principle that all officials 
must act with unwavering integrity, absolute impartiality, and complete devotion 
to the public interest. 
17 CONG. Q. 918 (1961). President Carter, too, is concerned with limiting conflicts 
of interest in his administration. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 6. 
Earlier, Common Cause, the public-interest lobbying group, had called for a funda-
mental overhaul of existing conflict of interest regulations after it had charged that 
the integrity and objectivity of decisions made by many federal agencies are seriously 
undermined by actual or potential conflicts of interest among agency officials and 
consultants. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1976, § ,1, at 22, col. 3. 
Three factors explain the heightened interest in conflict of interest problems. 
First, the problem of conflicts of interest has become a political issue. Many observ-
ers once felt that conflicts of interest created "situations in which the behavioral 
norms are not self-evident; campaign issues are, by contrast, normally gross and 
easily understood." Note, supra note 51, at 1213. Accord, Note, Conflicts of Inter-
est of State and Local Legislators, 55 IowA L. REv. 450, 451 (1969). In recent 
years, however, conflict of interest allegations have been viewed as potent political 
weapons. See Comment, Public Officials: The Constitutional Implications of Man-
datory Public Financial Disclosure Statutes, and a Proposal for Change, 1971 LAW 
AND Soc. ORD. 104, 104-05 (1971). 
Second, the press has scrutinized potentially conflicting situations with increasing 
vigilance. Id. at 104. Because there is no generally accepted definition of "conflict 
of interest," the press can often supply not only the relevant facts but also the stan-
dards by which the public is expected to judge a possible conflict of interest, as illus-
trated by the Marion J avits episode. See note 6 supra. 
Third, legislatures, particularly at the state level, have been prolific in their pro-
duction of conflicts of interest legislation. Especially noteworthy are the laws passed 
by several states that require substantial financial disclosure by candidates and office-
holders. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A-101 to -107 (Smith-Hurd 1975); CAL. 
GOVT. CODE§§ 87200-87202 (West 1975). 
54. There is little doubt that the incompatible-office doctrine is a form of conflict 
of interest regulation. See Note, Conflict of Interests: State Government Em-
ployees, 47 VA. L. REv. 1034, 1075 (1961). For example, United States v. Brown, 
381 U.S. 437, 453 n.28 (1965), refers to incompatible office provisions as being 
conflict of interest laws. 
55. U.S. CoNST., art. I,§ 6, cl. 2. 
56. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THB UNITED STATES 
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powers would be endangered if a person could hold positions in more 
than one branch of government. 57 Third, there was concern _ that 
legislators holding other positions might not act in the general public 
interest.58 Finally, the provision manifests a view that corruption 
could result from allowing one person to hold too much power. 59 
These general principles survive, but, even though the paucity 
of cases under the incompatibility clause makes generalization diffi-
cult, today most emphasis is probably placed upon the concerns in-
volving corruption and separation of powers. In Reservists Com-
mittee To Stop the War v. Laird,60 a federal district court concluded 
that the incompatibility clause prevented members of Congress from 
holding commissions in the armed forces reserves during their terms 
of office. 61 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground 
that plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the alleged violation, and 
it therefore did not reach the merits. Justice Douglas, in dissent, 
stated that concerns about corruption are the foundation of the 
clause which in his view provided a "specific bulwark against . 
potential abuses."62 
, Many states also have constitutional provisions proscribing in-
compatible offices for legislators. These prohibitions generally 
cover offices within the state government, 63 offices in other state 
635 (5th ed. 1891). Story maintained that the incompatibility clause reflects a fear 
that the federal government would receive preferential treatment. Id. But see Wat-
son, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 
CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1033 (1974), which suggests that the framers were concerned 
about parochialism. -
57. James Madison asserted that the incompatibility clause established a crucial 
guard against "the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body." THE 
FEDERALIST No. 76, at 476 (H. Lodge ed. 1888). 
58. See J. SI-ORY, supra note 56, at 635. 
59. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CoNSTITUTION 618 (1947); Watson, supra 
note 56, at 1038. 
60. 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), affd. mem. 495 F.2d 1075 (1972), revd. 
on other grounds sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208 (1974). 
61. "[f]he interest in maintaining independence among the branches of govern-
ment is shared by all citizens equally, and • . • this is the primary if not the sole 
purpose of the bar against Congressmen holding executive office." 323 F. Supp. 
at 841. On the Court's concern with incompatible offices, see Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). Cf. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) 
(stressing the importance of separation of powers, especially an independent judici-
ary). 
62. 418 U.S. at 232 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104 (1968)). 
63. A relatively recent report indicates that 37 states have constitutional provi-
sions stating that persons may not be seated in the state legislature if they hold 
certain other positions in the state government. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING REsEARCH 
FuND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDEX DIGESf OF STATE CoNsrITUTIONS, 662-63 
(2d ed. 1959 & Supp. 1971) (hereinafter cited as INDEX). See, e.g., ILL. CoNST. 
art. IV, § 3; TEX. CoNsr. art. III, § 19. 
The constitutions of 24 states bar the appointment of a member of the legislature 
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governments, 64 and offices in the federal government. oti Although 
it is often difficult to ascertain the purpose of these provisions, 
they probably were motivated by concerns similar to those that led 
to the adoption of the Constitution's incompatible-office clause.00 
The common law also prevented a person from holding incom-
patible offices. 67 Although the courts have established no clear 
rules on what constitutes an incompatible office, 68 a variety of tests 
to other offices created by or given salary increases by the legislature. INDEX, supra, 
at 663-64. See, e.g., N.D. CoNST. art. II, § 39. 
64. Twelve state constitutions generally prohibit legislators from holding positions 
in the government of another state. INDEX, supra note 63, at 666. See, e.g., TEX, 
CoNST. art. XVI, § 12; S.C. CoNST. art. III, § 24. 
65. The constitutions of 42 states forbid their legislators from holding federal 
appointments. INDEX, supra note 63, at 665. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. II, § 5; 
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
66. For example, in commenting on the convention that drafted the separation 
of powers provisions in the Virginia constitution, Thomas Jefferson stated: "[T]hat 
convention . . . laid its foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive, and 
judicial departments should be separate and distinct so that no person should exercise 
the powers of more than one of them at the same time." T. JEFFERSON, NOTES 
ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 1781-1785, ch. 13, reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE COM-
PLETE JEFFERSON 649 (1943). Note, however, Baker v. Hazen, 133 Vt. 433, 437, 
341 A.2d 707, 710 (1975), where the court stated that it was forced to construe 
the state constitutional provision on incompatible offices "[w]ith an uncertainty of 
the measure of the mischief sought to be prevented." 
Jefferson's incompatible-duties doctrine has been followed in many cases. Mon-
aghan v. School Dist. No. 1, 211 Ore. 360, 369, 315 P.2d 797, 804 (1957), con-
strued state constitutional provisions that focused, as Jefferson did, on separation 
of duties, as proscribing a public school teacher from simultaneously serving as a 
state legislator, since he was charged with ''functions of another department of gov-
ernment." 
With almost equal frequency, state courts view incompatible-office restraints as 
intended to prevent the accumulation of too much power in the hands of a single 
person. In McCutcheon v. City of St. Paul, 298 Minn. 443, 447, 216 N.W.2d 137, 
139 (1974), the Minnesota court expressed concern about individuals put in the 
position of being able to make policy decisions not subject to supervision. Similarly, 
in State ex rel. Harris v. Watson, 201 N.C. 661, 663, 161 S.E. 215, 216 (1931), 
the North Carolina court interpreted the state constitution's incompatible-office pro-
vision as intended to prevent the accumulation by a single person of offices of public 
trust. 
Some courts have viewed potential for corruption as another concern underlying 
incompatibility clauses. For example, the Arizona court in State ex rel. Pickrell v. 
Myers, 89 Ariz. 167, 169, 359 P.2d 757, 759 (1961), held that the Arizona constitu-
tion's incompatibility clause is intended to prevent legislative control over an office 
that a legislator might hold. 
67. Note, supra note 54, at 1071. See Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 446, 
96 A. 769, 770 (1916). 
68. This situation is best explained in Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 265, 148 A. 
434, 436 (1930): 
The courts, because of the difficulty in laying down any clear and comprehen-
sive rule as to what -constitutes incompatibility of offices, have evaded the formu-
lation of any definition, and as a rule have contented themselves with the dis-
cussion of the facts of the case under consideration, in connection with similar 
and analogous facts in other cases . . . • 
See also Knuckles v. Board of Educ., 272 Ky. 431, 435, 114 S.W.2d 511, 514 (1938), 
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have been suggested. Some courts apply the doctrine of incompati-
bility if one position is subordinate to the other. 69 Others consider 
whether one office holds the power of appointment to the other70 
or whether one position is responsible for auditing the accounts of 
the other. 71 Increasingly, however, courts are applying a more gen-
eral conflict of interest standard by determining whether the functions 
of the offices are inherently inconsistent and repugnant. 72 Regard-
less of the test used, the underlying concerns are generally the 
same:73 the interest in deterring corruption, 74 the interest in the un-
divided loyalty of the officeholder, 75 and the interest in maintaining 
public confidence in the legitimacy of government. 76 
69. See Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 266, 148 A. 434, 436 (1930); State ex rel. 
Hover. v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 116-18, 191 N.E.2d 723, 725-26 (1963); State 
ex rel. Metcalf v. Goff, 15 R.I. 505, 507, 9 A. 226,227 (1887). · 
10. See Knuckles v. Board of Educ., 272 Ky. 431, 435-36, 114 S.W.2d 511, 514 
(1938) (dictum). 
11. See People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 642, 107 P.2d 388, 
392 (1940) (dictum). 
72. See People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 641-42, 107 P.2d 
388, 391-92 (1940). But see Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A.2d 360 (1960), 
where the court attempted to distinguish conflicts of interest from conflicts of duties. 
In Reilly, the court maintained that conflicts of duty occur when incompatibility in-
heres "in the very relationship of one office to the other and is contemplated by 
the scheme of governmental activities, albeit the occasions may be rare." 33 N.J. 
at 549, 166 A.2d at 370. Conflicts of interest, however, arise from specific circum-
stances. In short, conflicts of interest are thought to require case-by-case considera-
tion, while conflicts of duty arise from the nature of the offices themselves regardless 
of the particular situation. 33 N.J. at 549-50, 166 A.2d at 370. This distinction 
may, however, be academic. See Note, supra note 54, at 1075. 
73. The common law seemed only minimally concerned with separation of powers. 
In Poynter v. Walling, 54 Del. 409, 415, 177 A.2d 641, 645 (1962), the court took 
notice of the fact that the doctrine of separation of powers had not been "adhered to 
with theoretical rigor." Noting constitutional changes in several states, the court said 
that " '[t]he inference may be drawn that partial relaxation of the doctrine of separa-
. tion of powers is not repugnant to the will of the people."' 54 Del. at 415, 177 A.2d 
at 645 (quoting In re Opinion of the Justices, 47 Del. (8 Terry) 117, 136, 88 A.2d 
128, 138 (1952)). See also Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93,369 P.2d 590 (1962), 
where the court maintained that a state constitutional provision required only that 
"the basic powers of the sovereignty • . . must remain separate, [and] not subsidiary 
activities" such as the ascertainment of fact, investigation, and consultation. 84 
Idaho at 100, 369 P.2d at 594. This position should be contrasted with the federal 
constitutional concerns about separation of powers evidenced by the incompatible-
office clause. See note 57 and accompanying text and note 61 supra. 
74. See Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 266, 148 A. 434, 436 (1930), where the 
court supported a presumption under the incompatible offices doctrine that a dual 
officeholder might be incapable of executing both responsibilities honestly. In State 
ex rel. Hover v. Wolven, 175 Ohio St. 114, 116, 191 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1963), the 
court referred to the danger of one office being used to accomplish purposes and 
duties not otherwise possible for the other office. 
15. See Jones v. McDonald, 33 NJ. 132, 135, 162 A.2d 817, 818 (1960). 
16. See Housing Auth. of New Haven v. Dorsey, 164 Conn. 247, 251, 320 A.2d 
820, 822 (1973). Cf. People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 186, 524 P.2d 363, 367, 
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In summary, the incompatible office doctrine identifies and 
protects at least five societal interests. First, it seeks to guard the 
separation of powers among the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment. Second, it aims to prevent a concentration of undue power 
in one public official. Third, it is designed to discourage corruption. 
Fourth, it attempts to foster the undivided loyalty of officeholders 
to the public interest. Finally, it hopes to maintain public confi-
dence in the integrity of government. 
B. Regulation by Statutes and Codes of Ethics 
Federal statutes and codes of ethics, like the incompatible office 
doctrine, seek to restrain possible conflicts of interest. Congress en-
acted legislation in 196277 designed to strengthen and consolidate 
the existing conflicts regulation. 78 These statutes are important to 
the present inquiry not so much for their substantive content as for 
the aid they give in identifying the general interest protected by 
typical conflicts legislation. The two statutes directly applicable to 
members of Congress79 merely prohibit them from representing 
private parties in agency matters in which the United States is a party 
or has a substantial interest80 and from practicing as attorneys in the 
Court of Claims. 81 The legislative history of predecessor statutes 
of the section involving agency matters demonstrates congressional 
concern about possible corruption and about the exercise of undue 
influence in public decisionmaking, 82 and, according to one source, 
115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 239 (1974) (risk to public confidence in criminal justice system 
when city attorney acts as defense attorney). 
77. 18 u.s.c. §§ 201-218 (1970). 
78. S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CoDB 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3852-53. 
19. See Krasnow & Lankford, Congressional Conflicts of Interest: Who Watches 
the Watchers?, 24 FED. B.J. 264,272 (1964). 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1970). 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 204 (1970). Neither the legislative history nor subsequent judi-
cial interpretation clearly indicates what interests are to be protected by § 204, In 
perhaps the most helpful statement on the subject, the Supreme Court found the pur-
pose of a predecessor statute to be "to promote efficiency and integrity in the dis-
charge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service," 
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 372 (1882), 
82. The general provisions of the current § 203 originated in a statute approved 
in 1864. 13 Stat. 123 (1864), noted in Manning, supra note 53, at 239 n.8. 18 
U.S.C. § 281 (1958) left this section essentially unchanged. 
In Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 368 (1906), the Supreme Court cited 
corruption and undue influence as the dangers sought to be avoided by enactment 
of the predecessor to § 203: 
I.T]he statute has for its main object to secure the integrity of executive 
action against undue influence upon the,part of members of that branch of the 
Government whose favor may have much to do with the appointment to, or 
retention in, public position of those whose official action it is sought to control 
or direct. 
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the provision "is broadly worded in order to cover all the multifarious 
forms of influence peddling whereby a member of Congress accepts 
compensation for acts and decisions made in his official capacity."83 
In commenting generally on the 1962 legislation,84 the House Judici-
ary Committee provided an excellent summary of the interests it 
intended to protect: 
The proper operation of a democratic government requires that 
officials be independent and impartial; that Government decisions 
and policy be- made in the proper channels of the governmental 
structure; that public office not be used for personal gain; and 
that the public have confidence in the integrity of its government. 
The attainment of one or more of these ends is impaired whenever 
there exists, or appears to exist, an actual or potential conflict be-
tween the private interests of a Government employee and his 
duties as an official. The public interest therefore, requires that 
the law protect against such conflicts of interest and establish appro-
priate ethical standards with respect to employee conduct in situa-
tions where actual or potential conflicts exist. 85 
Congressional interest in neutrality in decisionmaking and in free-
dom from corruption is also indicated by the House rule prohibiting 
members of Congress from voting on matters in which they have 
private interests. 86 
The various codes of ethics that Congress has adopted over the 
years provide further examples of that body's attitude on conflicts 
The Court goes ori to note that the attending evils are increased when financial re-
ward is involved. 202 U.S. at 368. 
In United States v. Reisley, 35 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.J. 1940), the district court as-
serted that prevention of corruption was the major concern of the same statute. The 
court, in referring to several conflict of interest statutes, stated: "Congress has enacted 
numerous statutes with the purpose of safeguarding the integrity of the public admin-
istration and has made penal many actions by public officers which would result 
in corruption in government." 35 F. Supp. at 104. In United States v. Anderson, 
509 F.2d 312, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court construed new § 203 as embodying 
these same concerns. 
83. Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 272. 
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1970) also includes several provisions that, though 
not directly applicable to members of Congress, have at least some relevance to the 
topic under discussion: 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) (activities of officers and employees 
in claims against and other matters affecting government); 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970) 
(disqualification of former officers and employees in matters connected with former 
duties or official responsibilities; disqualification of partners of executive branch em-
ployees); 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1970) (salary of government officials and employees 
payable only by the United States). · 
85. H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1961). A similar report from 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, less specific in pinpointing the interests to be pro-
tected, mentioned preventing "unethical conduct," S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1962), reprinted in [1962] 2 U.S. CODE CoNG. & An. NEWS 3852, 3853, and 
preserving "integrity." Id. at 3856. At least one other statute regulates conflicts 
of interest involving members of Congress. 46 U.S.C. § 1223(e) (1970) makes it 
unlawful for a contractor or charterer operating under the Merchant Marine Act 
to employ a member of Congress as "an attorney, agent, officer, or director." 
86. "Every Member • . • shall vote on each question put, unless he has a direct 
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of interest. The first code,87 passed in 1959 after Congress had felt 
considerable pressure to provide guidelines, 88 is applicable to all 
federal employees. 89 Its rather general provisions reveal the desire 
to prevent corruption, 90 to retain undivided loyalty to the public in-
terest, 91 and to maintain public confidence in government. 92 
In 1968, the Senate and House passed resolutions that estab-
lished separate, stringent ethics codes for each chamber and required 
financial disclosure by members of Congress. 93 The codes of both 
houses stressed the need to prevent corruption and to maintain 
loyalty to the public interest. 94 These same themes are evidenced 
in numerous 1977 amendments that create more stringent ethics 
personal or pecuniary interest in the event of such a question." JEFFERSON'S MANUAL 
AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 459, 86th Cong., 
2d Sess. 318 (1961). Administration of this provision is left largely to the discretion 
of the individual member. Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 276. 
The prohibition is traced to Thomas Jefferson's manual on parliamentary practice, 
which states: 
Where the private interests of a member are concerned in a bill or question, 
he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his voice has 
been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary, not only to the 
laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the social compact, which 
denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, it is for the honor of the 
House that this rule, of immemorial observance, should be strictly adhered to, 
U.S. CONGRESS, CoNSTITUTlON OF THE UNITED STATES (CoNSTITUTIONAL MANUAL 
RULES) 78 (1860-1861). 
87. H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 1312 (1958). 
88. See Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situations and Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 666, 697 (1959). 
89. The code's legislative history indicates that the code applies to members of 
Congress. S. REP. No. 1812, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958). 
90. This interest is most visible in the prohibition on taking "favors or benefits 
under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable persons as influencing 
the performance of . . . governmental duties." Further, government employees are 
commanded to "[e]xpose corruption wherever discovered" and to "[n]ever use any 
information coming . . . confidentially in the performance of governmental duties 
as a means for making private profit." H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 
72 Stat. 1312 (1958). 
91. H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 Stat. 1312 (1958), manifested 
concern about the "dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone" and engaging 
in business with the Government "inconsistent with the conscientious performance 
of . . . governmental duties." 
92. The code contains a general admonition to "(u]phold these principles, ever 
conscious that public office is a public trust." H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong,, 
2d Sess., 72 Stat. 1312 (1958). 
93. S. Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 7406 (1968), and H. Res. 
1099, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CoNG. REc. 8776 (1968). 
94. H. Res. 1099, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(a), 114 CoNG. REc. 8776 (1968); 
see S. Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2, 114 CONG, REC. 7406 (1968). The Senate 
resolution specifically proclaims that a public official "must never conduct his own 
affairs so as to infringe on the public interest." S. Res. 266, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 1 (1968). 
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codes and require more complete financial disclosure. 95 Both houses 
of Congress now require that members report personal financial 
information, which is subsequently disclosed to the public,96 indicat-
ing congressional concern for the interest in maintaining public 
confidence in the integrity of the government. 
The many interests identified thus far as meriting protection in 
conflicts of interest regulation may be refined into three broad socie-
tal norms. First, the regulation should assure that the government 
functions in a manner representative of the people it is designed to 
serve. This category thus includes the public interest in promoting 
undivided loyalty of officeholders to the public interest97 and in pre-
venting officials from using their positions for personal gain or for 
similar private purposes. 98 Second, the citizenry should have faith 
in the efficient and ethical operation of its government. 99 In order 
to promote a high level of public confidence, conflict of interest pro-
visions regulate situations in which the appearance of governmental 
impropriety is present. Third, the conflicts of interest regulation 
95. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (approved April 1, 1977); H. Res. 287, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (approved March 2, 1977). 
96. See S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977); H. Res. 2·87, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. § lOl(a) (1977). 
97. Commentators have generally cited "undivided loyalty" as a concern under-
lying conflict of interest regulation. As phrased by one author, "[a]n officer whose 
private interests would prevent him from exercising impartial judgment in matters 
of public concern should not be allowed to serve." 70 W. VA. L. REV. 400, 400 
(1968). Kaufman and Widiss noted that the California conflict of interest statutes 
sought "to insure that public officers in the discharge of their responsibilities are ab-
solutely free from any influence other than that which flows directly out of their obli-
gations to the public at large." Kaufman & Widiss, The California Conflict of 
Interest Laws, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 186, 186-87 (1963). Some of these "undivided 
loyalty" concepts are drawn from common-law theories that viewed public officials as 
trustees who were not to be pecuniarily involved in the affairs or interests of the 
beneficiary because of the danger that the trustee would "act to enhance his own 
interests rather than those of his cestui que trust." Note, Conflict-of-Interests of 
Government Personnel: An Appraisal of the Philadelphia Situation, 107 U. PA. L. 
REV. 985 (1959). The cestui que trust may be identified as the government, id., or 
the public, Note, supra note 54, at 1034. This fiduciary principle has been invoked 
where no specific statute covered a potential conflict of interest situation. See United 
States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910). 
98. One author noted that "[h]onesty of government officials, whether elected 
or appointed, is essential to the American political system." Comment, supra note 
53, at 104. Another commentator expressed the concern that "public officials should 
not have a personal interest in the business transactions in which they are engaged 
for government, nor should they exploit their influence or acquaintances with persons 
who conduct their transactions so that businesses in which they have a personal inter-
est are profited." Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 686. See also Note, supra note 53, 
at 450; Note, supra note 54, at 1045. 
99. Many commentaries indicate that conflict of interest provisions generally 
serve to protect the image of government, commonly referring to the need to main-
tain "public confidence" in the integrity of public officials. See, e.g., Comment, Leg-
islative Conflicts of Interest-An Analysis of the Pennsylvania Legislative Code of 
Ethics, 19 VILL. L. REv. 82 ( 1973); Note, supra note 53, at 450. 
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should help ensure that certain processes are followed in governmental 
decisionmaking-those that transform public desire into public policy 
through compliance with the policymaking designs established in 
the Constitution and subsequent .legislation. This societal notion is 
particularly concerned with preventing the accumulation of power 
in the hands of one person, with preserving the separation of powers 
among the three branches of government, and with promoting 
economy and efficiency in government.100 Any effective conflict 
of interest legislation must be consistent with these three norms. 
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE MARRIAGE CONTEXT 
The 1977 revisions of the codes of conduct in both houses 
provide the one direct example of members of Congress considering 
potential conflicts of interest in both their activities and the activities 
of their spouses.101 Members of the House are now required to re-
port information regarding income,102 gifts,103 reimbursements,10' 
property, 105 securities, 106 and liabilities.107 Information on these 
Others stress the related, but perhaps more superficial, concern with the appear-
ance of impropriety. See Note, supra note 51, at 1209. Freilich and Larson asserted 
that "we would contend . . • that a concern for 'appearances' is not ill-founded. The 
public is entitled to the services of men who are intelligent enough to know at least 
what appears to be improper. It is bad enough to appear incompetent; there is no 
reason to appear dishonest." Freilich & Larson, supra note 53, at 376. 
100. Concerns about accumulation of power and separation of powers are seldom 
mentioned as interests protected by conflict of interest legislation not dealing witb 
incompatibility. When separation of powers is mentioned, it is usually in the context 
of the need for the branches of government to police themselves, in order to avoid 
infringement on powers by imposing conflict guidelines on each other. See Eisen-
berg, supra note 88, at 696. 
The promotion of governmental efficiency is in large part a corollary to the con-
cern about preventing corruption, since a "corrupt government is an inefficient gov-
ernment." SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FEDERAL CoNFLICT OF INTEREST LAws, THE As-
SOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CnY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND 
FEDERAL SERVICE 6 (1960). 
101. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977). 
102. Members must report the source and amount of all "[i]tems of income (in-
cluding honorariums) from a single source aggregating $100 or more." H. Res. 287, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l0l(a) (1977). 
103. With certain exceptions, reports must be made of gifts from a single source 
aggregating $100 or more in value. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (a) 
(1977). The most significant exception is that only gifts of "transportation, lodging, 
food or entertainment from a single source (other than from a relative of [a member] 
reporting) aggregating $250 or more in value" need be reported. H. Res. 287, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) (1977). 
104. Direct or indirect reimbursements from a single source for expenditures ag-
gregating $250 or more must be disclosed. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 
(a) (1977). 
105. Reports must be made of "any property held, directly or indirectly, in a 
trade or business or for investment or the production of income and which has a 
fair market value of at least $1,000." H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l0l(a) 
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matters also must be supplied for "the spouse of the [member] 
reporting [if such] information relates to items under constructive 
control of' the member.108 However, the constraints placed on 
House members regarding the acceptance of gifts109 and the accruing 
of outside earned income110 appear to have no direct impact on a 
member's spouse. 
The Senate's new financial disclosure regulations are quite 
similar to those of the House: indeed, the requirements for report-
ing income, gifts, property, securities, and liabilities are virtually 
identical.111 The Senate rules, however, require less complete dis-
closure for interests of a member's spouse.112 Another new Senate 
rule explicitly prohibits a member's spouse from accepting gifts with 
annual aggregate value over $100 if the donor has a direct interest 
in legislation before Congress.113 But, like the House rules, the 
Senate regulations on outside earned income place no specific con-
straints on the income of a member's spouse. 
One new Senate provision does address conflicts of interest aris-
ing from the employment of a member's spouse. It states that 
[n]o Member . . . shall knowingly use his official position to intro-
(1977). With some exceptions, there also must be disclosure of "any purchase or 
sale, directly or indirectly, of any interest in real property" with value in excess of 
$1,000. H. Res. 287, 95thCong., lstSess. § lOl(a) (1977). 
106. Listing must be made of most transactions of securities and commodities 
futures in excess of $1,000. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) (11-977). 
107. Identification of most liabilities exceeding $2,500 must be made. H. Res. 
287, 95th Cong., lstSess. § lOl(a) (1977). 
108. H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) (1977). 
109. "A Member ... shall not accept gifts (other than personal hospitality of 
an individual or with a fair market value of $35 or less) in any calendar year aggre-
gating $100 or more in value, directly or indirectly, from any person (other than 
from a relative of his) having a direct interest in legislation before the Congress 
or who is a foreign national (or agent of a foreign national)." H. Res. 287, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1977). 
110. Members of the House may not have annual outside earned income "in ex-
cess of 15 per centum of the aggregate salary as a Member paid to the Member." 
Id. § 601. Several sources, such as certain pension plans, profit-sharing programs, 
and family businesses, are not viewed as producing outside income. Income attribu-
table to a member's spouse is apparently excluded from the outside income category 
by the notation that "[o]utside earned income shall be determined without regard 
to any community property law." H. Res. 287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § lOl(a) 
(1977). 
111. See S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977). 
112. The minimum amounts above which earned income and gifts must be re-
ported are lower for members' interests than for those of their spouses. A Senator 
is required to report holdings or sale of real property, holdings of personal property, 
and the transaction of securities or commodities futures only if these interests were 
in the "constructive control" of the Senator. One is stated to be in "constructive 
control" if "the enhancement of the interest would substantially benefit the reporting 
individual." S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977). 
113. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977). 
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duce or aid the progress or passage of legislation, a principal pur-
pose of which is to further only his pecuniary interest, only the 
pecuniary interest of his immediate family, or only the pecuniary 
interest of a limited class of persons or enterprises, when he, or his 
immediate family, or enterprises controlled by them are members 
of the affected class.114 
It is apparent that only rather egregious conflicts of interest are con-
trolled by this section. More subtle conflicts, such as those con-
templated by this Note,115 go unregulated. 
In dealing with conflicts of interest, Congress has indicated that 
it sees substantial financial and legal interdependence between 
members and their spouses. This view is expressed by the rule in 
both houses that requires extensive disclosure of the financial condi-
tion of each member's spouse. The ethics codes of both houses, 
however, do little to restrict the employment or financial activities 
of members' spouses. Thus, the ethics regulations of each house 
indicate that, when faced with the competing interests of the public's 
demand for stricter conflict of interest regulation and society's in-
creasing recognition of autonomy for marital partners, Congress has 
chosen to give weight to the conflict of interest considerations. 
However, the failure of Congress to put major restraints other than 
financial disclosure on members' spouses might be viewed as at 
least some compromise between these competing interests.U0 
Several conflicts of interest problems that occur outside the con-
gressional area may provide useful analogies. Conflicts that arise 
because both spouses are practicing attorneys are occurring more 
frequently, "for it is a fact of modern society that women are 
entering the profession in increasing numbers and that increasing 
numbers of these women are married to lawyers."117 In a formal 
opinion concerning a hypothetical situation in which both husband 
and wife were lawyers who did not practice in the same firm, an 
American Bar Association committee found no impropriety where 
one spouse represented a party adverse to one represented by the 
other spouse's firm so long as full disclosure of the potential conflicts 
in this employment arrangement was made to the client. 118 This 
114. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977). 
115. See text at notes 132-34 infra. 
116. Irrespective of possible congressional intent to strike a compromise, the fi-
nancial disclosure regulations may have the indirect effect of greatly restricting the 
employment activity of a member's spouse. See note 183 infra. 
117. ABA STANDING CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL -ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 340, at 
2 (1975). 
118. The committee believed that a husband-wife team was "not necessarily pro-
hibited from representing different interests or from being associated with firms rep-
resenting different interests." Id. at 1. It stated that "the situation should be fully 
explained to the client and the question of acceptance left to the client for decision," 
Id. 
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result demonstrates a compromise between the emerging concept of 
spousal independence and the prevention of conflicts of interest. 
The committee viewed the marriage partners as sufficiently inde-
pendent to exercise professional judgment unaffected by the other's 
opinion, and therefore it rejected a complete prohibition of spousal 
representation of conflicting interests. Recognizing, however, that 
the closeness of the marital relationship might lead to inadvertent 
improper conduct, 119 the committee did not consider the spouses as 
entirely independent practitioners, and therefore it required disclo-
sure to the client.120 
Employees in the executive branch are also bound by conflicts 
of interest provisions that regulate spouses. Federal employees are, 
for instance, generally prohibited from holding personal financial in-
terests in governmental matters in which they are substantially 
involved, 121 and the prohibition specifically includes interests of the 
employee's spouse.122 This approach indicates a perception of an 
interrelationship in marriage that could preclude independent judg-
ment by the employee.123 Similarly, Executive Order 11,222,124 
119. The committee stated: 
[I]t also must be recognized that the relationship of husband and wife is so 
close that the possibility of an inadvertent breach of a confidence or the un-
avoidable receipt of information concerning the client by the spouse other than 
the one who represents the client (for example, information contained in a tele-
phone message left for the lawyer at home) is substantial. 
Id. 
120. Within the past several years, regulatory groups in Arizona, Colorado, Illi-
nois, and Virginia have produced opinions limiting husband-wife attorney activity. 
Note, Legal Ethics-Representation of Differing Interests by Husband and Wife: 
Appearances of Impropriety and Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest?, 52 DEN. L.J. 
735, 735-36 (1975). These rulings-if still meaningful after the later ABA opinion 
discussed in the text-would severely restrict the ability of husband-wife attorney 
teams to seek jobs in the same geographic area. Id. at 737. 
121. 18 u.s.c. § 208 (1970). 
122. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1970). 
123. These provisions are less stringent than they might seem at first glance. 
If the employee fully discloses a potential conflict and the government official who 
was responsible for his appointment renders a written determination "that the interest 
is not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of the services" 
of the employee, the prohibitions of the statute will not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b) 
(1970). 
The regulations of the Civil Service Commission express few concerns about po-
tential "incompatible office" problems arising out of the hiring of agency employees. 
The only specific limitation is that not more than two persons from the same imme-
diate family can be employed in the competitive branch of the civil service program. 
18 U.S.C. § 3319(a) (1970). Under the regulations, both husband and wife may 
be employed in the civil service provided no regulations of the individual agency 
are violated. The Commission's regulations are primarily concerned with problems 
of nepotism or favored employment status for members of one family, since few 
civil service positions involve the sort of policymaking to which issues of judgmental 
independence are relevant. 
124. 3 C.F.R. 306 (1965). 
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which is directed at federal agencies and departments, requires that 
the financial interests of a spouse or other family member125 be con-
sidered part of the interests of the employee.126 
Finally, a few state courts also have considered the issue, usually 
when participation by a public official in a decision is challenged be-
cause a spouse or other relative of the official allegedly had an inter-
est in the result. Courts have generally held that the interest of a 
relative is not a disqualifying factor.127 If the relationship is marital, 
however, the courts have been more likely to disqualify the offi-
cial.128 Those courts finding no direct conflict of interest when both 
husband ·and wife are somehow involved in a decision tend to rest 
their opinions on the ability of both to make contracts and to retain 
their own earnings.129 Cases finding an improper interest under 
these circumstances are based on the belief that each spouse inevit-
ably benefits from the other's individual income and financial trans-
actions. For example, in Githens v. Butler County,180 the Supreme 
125. The interests of any other member of the employee's immediate household 
also are considered to be an interest of the employee. See id. 
Individual departmental and agency regulations have emulated these provisions, 
See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 10.735-405(c) (1977) (Department of State). More extensive 
reporting of a spouse's holdings and business affairs is required under 28 C.F.R. 
§ 45.735-22 (1975) (Department of Justice). 
126. President Carter's proposal for a new executive order on this subject appar-
ently would continue to require disclosure of personal finances by both governmental 
employees and their spouses. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1977, § A, at 17, col. 1. 
Intra-family gifts, on the other hand, are excepted from the restrictions on the 
receipt of gifts or favors by federal employees. Exceptions are made where "obvious 
family or personal relationships rather than the business of the person concerned 
. . . are the motivating factors-the clearest illustration being the parents, children 
or spouses of federal employees." Executive Order 11,222, § 201(b), 3 C.F.R. 156 
(1974). Similar exceptions are made in individual departmental and agency regula-
tions. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 0.735-ll(b)(l) (1976) (Federal Trade Commission); 
24 C.F.R. § 0.735-203(b)(l) (1977) (Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment). The regulations of the Department of Agriculture define this exception to 
the gifts and favors rule as employee acceptance of "courtesies in an obvious family 
or personal relationship" when it is clear that the relationship is the "motivating 
factor." 7 C.F.R. § 0.735-12(b)'(l) (1976). 
127. Annot., 74 A.L.R. 790, 792 (1931). The rule has been generally followed 
in more recent cases. 
128. Arkansas, Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio decisions indicate no conflict, see 
note 129 infra; Idaho, Missouri, and West Virginia cases take the opposite position. 
See notes 130-31 infra and accompanying text. Because of their age, some of these 
cases are of questionable validity. 
129. See Thompson v. School Dist. No. 1, 252 Mich. 629, 630-31, 233 N.W. 
439, 439-40 (1930). Other cases finding no improper interest are based on determi-
nations that the accused spouse received no pecuniary benefit. See Brewer v. Howell, 
299 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Ark. 1957); Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 408-
09, 206 A.2d 678, 683 (1964). In Board of Educ. v. Boal, 104 Ohio St. 482, 48S-
86, 135 N.E. 540, 541 (1922), the Ohio court made an unusual statutory interpreta-
tion that would allow public officials to be involved in making a public contract 
with their spouses but not with their fathers, mothers, brothers, or sisters. 
130. 350 Mo. 295, 299, 165 S.W.2d 650 (1942). 
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Court of Missouri noted that, "[t]hough the husband may have no 
present interest in his wife's separate estate[,] there can be no ques-
tion but that because of the relationship he does have such a bene-
ficial interest in her property and affairs as to be 'indirectly' inter-
ested in any contract to which she is a party.msi 
In summary, to date the governmental policies developed on 
conflict of interest arising out of marriage have tended to treat 
spouses both as individuals and as persons whose interdependence 
might impair their personal judgment. To avoid overbroad regula-
tions, however, and perhaps to avoid undue impairment of employ-
ment possibilities for each spouse, disclosure has been the primary 
means of setting standards for conflicts situations. Whether this 
scheme is a necessary or adequate safeguard for Congress remains 
to be considered. 
IV. NECESSITY OF CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION 
In designing legislation or other regulatory devices to control 
conflicts of interest arising out of the relationship between members 
of Congress and their spouses, the basic policy question is whether 
marriage can affect the decisions of a member of Congress in ways 
contrary to the public interest. In analyzing this question, personal 
relationships should be viewed as a continuum. At one extreme of 
the continuum, people are mere acquaintances with no strong personal 
ties. At the other extreme are those relationships in which two per-
sons are bound together by close kinship combined with strong legal, 
financial, and emotional connections, all of which result in a near 
identity of interests. In between, of course, fall myriad relationships 
of varying degrees of intimacy--close relatives, close personal 
friends, individual members of common interest groups, and the like. 
In determining the need for regulation in any of these situations, one 
must examine the extent to which the relationship endangers the basic 
norms previously identified as protected by conflicts of interest regu-
lation: protection of popular representation, protection of public 
131. 350 Mo. at 299, 165 S.W.2d at 652. See also Clark :v. Utah Constr. 
Co., 51 Idaho 587, 8 P.2d 454 (1932); Nuckols v. Lyle, 8 Idaho 589, 70 P. 401 
(1902). At least one court found an indirect interest of the husband even in the 
face of the married women's property acts: 
Giving to the various statutes guaranteeing to married women control of their 
separate estates, and free from the control of the husband, and with recognition 
of the many legal refinements which may be drawn therefrom, we are still of 
the opinion that either a husband or wife, living together as such, has pecuniary 
interest in a contract of employment of the other . . . . [T]here is still a rela-
tion existing between husband and wife, and mutual liabilities growing out of 
the family relation, which creates, on the part of each, an interest in the con-
tracts of the other, out of which compensation arises, and the proceeds of which 
are used directly or indirectly in the family circle. 
Haislip v. White, 22 S.E.2d 361, 365-66 (W. Va. 1942). 
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confidence in government, and protection of proper decisionmaking 
processes. And affecting the level of danger to these norms are 
three aspects of personal relationships-the financial, the domicili-
ary, and the emotional. 
Close financial ties particularly endanger the representative 
nature of government. A person with financial responsibility to 
another might be tempted to deviate from undivided loyalty to the 
public interest in order to avoid monetary harm to, or create tangible 
benefits for, the other person. Furthermore, regardless of whether 
it creates an actual constraint on independent judgment, a financial 
interrelationship creates a public impression of divided loyalty that 
can decrease confidence in government. Also, a financial interrela-
tionship between a member of Congress and an employee of either 
the public or private sector could generate doubts about the validity 
of governmental decisionmaking. The simplest example of this 
problem is where the financial ties between a member of Congress 
and an employee in the executive branch threaten the separation of 
powers and the accompanying checks and balances deemed impor-
tant by society. This particular combination of interests also tends 
to result in the accumulation of more power than would be available 
to the individual acting alone. The separation of powers problem 
does not apply if the second party is employed in the private sector, 
but major concern would still exist over improper influence on gov-
ernmental decisionmaking. 
The second aspect of personal relationships that may raise a 
conflict of interest problem is the sharing of a domicile.132 A 
public servant might have considerable difficulty maintaining im-
partiality in matters involving a person with whom he lives. Such 
an interrelationship may also impair public confidence in govern-
ment because its visibility enhances the inference of impropriety. 
Perhaps most important, a shared domicile may infringe upon the 
societal interest in the validity of governmental decisionmaking. 
Presumably, persons sharing a household communicate on a full 
range of subjects, and this exchange of information may inadvert-
ently or intentionally include confidential matters. This communica-
tion could be a source of corruption if one person is a member of 
Congress and the other works in the private sector, or it could en-
danger the separation of powers if the second person works in a dif-
ferent branch of the government.188 
132. Similar concerns might arise about people who share an office or who habit-
ually work in close proximity to each other. 
133. The domiciliary relationship has been subject to prior regulation in the con-
flict of interest area. The financial disclosure requirements in Executive Order 
11,222 § 403(a), 3 C.F.R. 306 (1965), state that "[t]he interest of a spouse, minor 
child, or other member of his immediate household shall be considered to be an 
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Finally, an emotional relationship between a member of 
Congress and an employee in the public or private sector may con-
strain the former's ability to have undivided loyalty to the public good 
when the interests of the other person are inconsistent with those 
of the public. i-s¼ This arrangement potentially compromises the 
"representative" role of a public official and will give the appearance 
of impropriety should the relationship become generally known. As 
with financial interrelationships, the existence of emotional ties be-
tween such individuals might create a joinder of interests suf-
ficient to raise doubts about the validity of the governmental 
decisionmaking in which one or both are involved due either to in-
fringement of the separation of powers or to the undue concentration 
of power. 
In applying to marriage the three aspects of personal relation-
ships identified .above, the inquiry is not necessarily narrowed. Not 
every married couple maintains a substantial financial interrelation-
ship;135 spouses do not always share a domicile;186 and, within its 
legal definition, marriage does not require .an emotional attachment 
of partners.137 It does appear, however, that the large majority of 
American marriages do create a "community of interests" that in-
cludes at least one of these interrelationships.138 Furthermore, re-
interest of a person required to submit" financial disclosure information under the 
order. For a discussion of the domiciliary relationship in another context, see note 
119 supra. 
134. Scrupulous persons, of course, presumably can adequately separate their pub-
lic and private lives. In the Javits controversy, see note 3 supra, Senator Javits 
stated, "In our respective professional activity, my wife and I lead independent lives. 
I do not attempt to direct her as to choices and attitudes in her work and she does 
not influence me in mine." N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 3. 
135. The law still generally presumes such relationships. See note 24 and accom-
panying text supra. 
136. See REsrA.TEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 2l(d) (1971). The 
U.S. Senate's recent amendments to its financial disclosure rules recognize the sepa-
rate domicile situation by not requiring disclosure "with respect to the interests of a 
spouse living separate and apart from the reporting" Senator. S. Res. 110, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977). 
137. Marriage is generally viewed as a civil contract. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STA.T. 
§ 42-101 (1974); NEV. REv. SrA.T. § 122.010 (1975). Acknowledgment of emotional 
attachment occurs in traditional marriage ceremonies, but these are not required by 
state law. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STA.T. § 42-109 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.110 
(1975). 
138. The law itself, through probate provisions, creates some financial interde-
pendence within all marriages, and few married couples can keep current earnings 
completely separate. These financial interrelationships are a particularly potent 
threat to the interests protected by conflict of interest legislation. 
It can reasonably be assumed that an emotional relationship exists in most mar-
riages that includes some sense of loyalty to the other spouse. If this loyalty were 
to conflict with the undivided loyalty a government official is supposed to have , to 
the public, one could not expect the official always to choose the public's interests 
over those of the spouse. 
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gardless of the true state of affairs, at present the general public 
surely perceives that these important ties do exist between spouses. 
And that perception indicates that society sees danger in spouses 
having the employment combinations discussed above.180 
This analysis suggests that the actual or presumed closeness of 
the marital relationship poses a serious threat to the interests pro-
tected by conflicts legislation. Recent congressional action to regu-
late the activities of members' spouses140 is consistent with the general 
principles of conflicts of interest theory and the trends of regulation 
in this area.141 But, in utilizing disclosure as the primary regulatory 
device, it is not clear that Congress has chosen the most effective 
safeguard. 
V. MODES OF REGULATION 
Many methods of regulating conflicts of interest might seem ap-
propriate to guard against the dangers identified in this Note, as well 
as against numerous other conflicts situations.142 Six possible regu-
latory approaches are (1) legislative self-regulation, (2) regulation 
by the electorate, (3) regulation by the executive department, (4) 
statutory regulation, (5) a code of ethics with internal enforcement, 
and (6) a code of ethics with an independent ethics commission. 
Legislative self-regulation would probably be based upon an 
"honor system" under which each member of Congress would 
139. It might be helpful to illustrate this conclusion with hypothetical situa-
tions portraying the dangers that warrant protective action. If a member of 
Congress had a spouse in a policymaking position on a regulatory commission, even 
inadvertent collusion could result in special treatment of a particular case by that 
commission to the political benefit of the member of Congress, a result that would 
be particularly plausible if a constituent's interests were involved. This possibility. 
of special treatment raises questions concerning the undivided loyalty of the regula-
tory official involved. Furthermore, the ability of that governmental employee to 
give the spouse certain agency or departmental information might give the member 
of Congress undue power to accomplish goals by working within the system. Lastly, 
the potential influence of the governmental employee over the spouse in Congress 
on departmental funding and other matters raises questions about the separation of 
powers. 
Many of these dangers also exist where the spouse is employed in the private 
sector. For example, the member of Congress could be influenced to support certain 
legislation favorable to the private employer, which raises questions about the preser-
vation of undivided loyalty to the public interest. Also of grave concern is the access 
-and potential misuse for personal gain-of the private-sector spouse to information 
meant for use solely by the member of Congress. For a discussion of this problem, 
see Kalo, Deterring Misuse of Confidential Information: A Proposed Citizen's Action, 
72 MICH. L. REV. 1577 (1974). In either of these situations, the mere existence of 
the marriage-employment relationship may lead to public cynicism and mistrust about 
governmental operations. 
140. See notes 101°15 supra and accompanying text. 
141. See section II supra. 
142. See B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFUCT OF INTEREST LAW 2-4 (1964). 
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monitor his or her own actions and inform the Congress whenever 
a conflict arises.143 Because no specific disclosure requirements 
would fit into such a scheme, however, no explicit sanctions could 
be designed for members who failed to disclose a conflict. 
Members of Congress might perceive two principal motivations 
for compliance with this system. First, at least if the public is aware 
of the self-regulatory scheme·, members of Congress would be in-
duced to try to gain political advantage by demonstrating compli-
ance.144 Second, legislators would be encouraged to avoid the most 
blatant breaches. A principal fault of this approach, however, is 
that, without the application of pressure to comply by an external 
agency, some members of Congress will almost certainly not abide 
by whatever conflict standards are established.145 The individual 
discretion inherent in self-enforcement would also allow each mem-
ber to make independent and possibly self-serving interpretations of 
existing standards. 
Under a second method of regulation, the electorate could 
determine when unethical conflict of interest situations have arisen 
by voting out of office individuals whom they deem to have violated 
the norms. This approach would make it unnecessary to define for-
mally society's view of the marital relationship and the conflicts of 
interest resulting therefrom. It would also provide a democratic 
solution to a politically volatile issue. Despite these advantages, 
however, this solution is deficient because it would produce unequal 
and sporadic enforcement. This method fails to guarantee any ra-
tional standards by which legislators could review their projected ac-
tions, 146 and a member of Congress often could not knowingly 
comply with standards until his or her job was jeopardized. Fur-
thermore, voters seeking to identify appropriate standards of ethics 
by which to measure tlie performance of an incumbent could be 
greatly influenced by battling political forces.147 
143. There is precedent for such an approach. The MoNT. CONST. of 1889, art. 
V, § 44, stated that a "member who has a p~rsonal or a private interest in any 
measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislative assembly, shall disclose 
the fact to the house of which he is a member, and shall not vote thereon." The 
1972 Montana Constitution deleted this provision, but it did provide for the establish-
ment of a code of ethics for state officials. MONT. CONST., art. XIII, § 4. 
144. If a conflict were discovered that had not been self-disclosed, the failure of 
the member of Congress to report it would create an impression of conscious wrong-
doing. Thus, in this regard, self-regulation is similar to enforcement through the 
electorate. 
145. See Note, supra note 51, at 1211-12. Stronger regulation is called for even 
if only a few would violate the standards. 
146. Note, supra note 51, at 1214. 
147. Id. at 1213. Furthermore, this procedure does not allow the immediate en-
forcement of ethical standards that might be desirable in dealing with members of 
Congress. See Note, supra note 53, at 455. · 
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These problems, along with the importance of a public percep-
tion of honesty in government, indicate the need for including speci-
fic standards of performance in conflicts of interest regulations. Be-
cause of the great public concern about the operation of government, 
a relatively innocent act by an official can lead to public uproar.148 
Definitive standards of conduct should allow a public official to avoid 
these minor indiscretions and the accompanying perceptions of 
scandal and trials by the press.149 Furthermore, the existence of ex-
plicit standards might increase public confidence in the integrity of 
government by encouraging the public official to recognize that his 
or her position is a public trust.150 
In a third method of regulation, the executive branch would 
serve as a watchdog for conflicts of interest arising in the legislative 
branch.151 Although this approach might be useful at state and local 
levels of government, it is of dubious constitutional validity and po-
litical legitimacy at the federal level.152 Informal enforcement 
devices are now used occasionally by the executive branch,u3 and 
these "policing" efforts should be encouraged to the extent that their 
purpose is more honorable than mere political gain. This fear of 
misuse-that political infighting will masquerade as ethical regula-
tion-is the primary drawback to the method. The power of an exe-
cutive official to challenge conduct of a legislator creates many of 
the same problems that conflicts of interest regulation is designed 
to remedy. In effect, this scheme would simply transform public 
doubt in legislative officials to public doubt in executive officials. 
And, when the perceived potential for misuse of power by the regu-
lators is combined with the lack of specificity in standards that would 
result from this scheme, it becomes apparent that this enforcement 
scheme must be rejected. 
Controlling conflicts through statutory regulation would avoid the 
148. See Freilich & Larson, supra note 53, at 374; Manning, supra note 53, 
at 247-48. 
149. In the Marion Javits episode described in note 3 supra, no official body 
raised questions about Mrs. Javits' employment and her husband's concurrent service 
in the Senate. The questions were raised and, in large part, the standards were set 
by the press. 
150. As stated in one commentary, "[t]he conscience of each individual pro-
vides one of the most effective guides for the conduct of most public officials. How-
ever, even public servants acting in good faith need an ascertainable standard as 
a basis for evaluating their conduct." Kaufman & Widiss, supra note 97, at 206. 
151. See Note, supra note 53, at 453-54. 
152. For example, this scheme would raise questions about interference with the 
separation of powers. 
153. The executive branch can refuse to grant favors to any legislator whose con-
duct has been questionable. See Note, supra note 53, at 453-54. The executive de-
partment can also suggest an investigation of a member of Congress. See Note, 
supra note 51, at 1218. 
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problems of lack of specificity.154 One potential objection to this 
scheme asserts that statutes create inflexible constraints and that 
these rigid restrictions on officeholders might discourage competent 
individuals from seeking the positions.155 Some commentators now 
qualify their demands for conflicts of interest legislation with the 
notion that the statute must produce the least possible deterrence to 
those considering public sector employment.156 The failure to con-
sider this factor would probably tend to have a disproportionate 
impact on women, since more often than not the husband is the 
public officeholder.157 
Probably a stronger objection to regulation by legislation is the 
difficulty of drafting a statute to cover all situations involving con-
flicts of interest. A statute that governed a reasonable range of 
spousal conflict situations would tend either to be so vague that it 
154. Some commentators have supported the statutory mode of enforcement, at 
least for readily definable conflicts. See, e.g., Note, supra note 53, at 456. 
155. Justice Holmes once stated that "[u]niversal distrust creates universal in-
competence." Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 480 (1913). However, 
another commentator has said that, "[w]hile every citizen has a right to become an 
officeholder, at times one must subordinate this right to the public good." 70 
W. VA. L. REV. 400,400 (1968). 
156. See Note, supra note 53, at 450; Note, supra note 99, at 986. There is 
evidence that these countervailing considerations played a major role in the drafting 
of the existing federal conflict of interest statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970) ). 
A report of the House Judiciary Committee noted: 
It is also fundamental to the effectiveness of democratic government that, 
to the maximum extent possible, the most qualified individuals in society serve 
its government. Accordingly, legal protections against conflicts of interest must 
be so designed as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to impede the recruitment 
and retention by the Government of those men and women who are most quali-
fied to serve it. An essential principle underlying the staffing of our governmen-
tal structure is that its employees should not be denied the opportunity, available 
to all other citizens, to acquire and retain private economic and other interests, 
except where actual or potential conflicts with the responsibility of such em-
ployees to the public cannot be avoided. 
H.R. REP. No. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961). The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee praised the bill for properly balancing these interests: 
[l]n the interest of facilitating the Government's recruitment of persons with 
specialized knowledge and skills for service on a part-time basis, it [the leg-
islation] would limit the impact of those laws on the persons so employed with-
out depriving the Government of protection against unethical conduct on their 
part. 
S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 3853. 
Robert Kennedy, then the Attorney General, saw the Congress as intending the 
statutes to bolster the government's recruiting power in areas where overly onerous 
restrictions had prevented an expansion of talent. MEMORANDUM OF ATIORNEY 
GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY REGARDING CoNFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISIONS OF PUB-
LIC LA.w 87-849, 28 Fed. Reg. 985 (1963), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 201, at 4169 
(1970). 
157. Over-regulation could discriminate against women because men tend to fin-
ish their education and enter the job market prior to their spouses. See TuE CAR-
NEGIE COMMISSION ON HlGffiiR EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 83-85 (1973). Thus, inflexible regulation could severely limit the job 
choices for wives of Congressmen. 
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would be of little use in actually regulating conduct or so overbroad 
that the chilling effect of over-regulation might occur. 158 Perhaps 
more important, both the concept of marital roles and the concept 
of conflict of interest are inherently vague, and thus any workable 
plan of regulation would need to be flexible. Because statutes by 
their very nature tend to be rigid, this form of regulation would ig-
nore some of the relevant variables in the conflict of interest-marital 
role milieu.159 In the final analysis, this inability to deal with the 
158. Although we cannot know the amount of undetected conflict of interest in 
government, there is empirical evidence that most of the existing statutes are seldom 
invoked. In 1958, when Congress promulgated 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218, predecessor 
statutes had resulted in the indictment of only a dozen members of Congress in the 
preceding century. Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 271. Some cases have 
arisen against members of Congress under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-218 (1970). See United 
States v. Podell, 519 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975) (§ 203); 
United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (§ 201); United States v. 
Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973) (§ 203). But there is little evidence of any 
dramatic rise in the level of enforcement. 
Other cases indicate some willingness on the part of the courts and prosecutors 
to enforce the federal statutes more strictly against employees of the executive 
branch. See United States v. Bailey, 498 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where two fed-
eral employees enrolled in part-time legal studies were barred from entering an ap-
pearance on behalf of indigent criminal appellants under 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) 
(prohibiting federal employees from appearing as agents or attorneys on behalf of 
anyone in a proceeding to which the United States is a party). 
There are two explanations for this hesitancy to enforce the statutes against mem-
bers of Congress. Some see the Justice Department as extremely reluctant to press 
charges against a member of Congress unless the misconduct is very grave. See, e.g., 
Krasnow & Lankford, supra note 79, at 271. Others attribute the lack of enforcement 
of conflict of interest statutes to the inability to derive clear standards from them. 
See, e.g., Note, supra note 97, at 986. 
In general, the difficult definitional problems facing a governmental body trying 
to enforce ethical restrictions can eviscerate conflict of interest legislation. Professor 
Eisenberg has observed that the "existing criminal statutes dealing with conflict situa-
tions either are applicable to clearly repugnant behavior or phrased so generally as 
to exclude a host of activities that form the real core of the problem." Eisenberg, 
supra note 88, at 671. Some commentators see this definitional problem as intract-
able. See, e.g., Note, State Legislative Conflicts of Interest: An Analysis of the 
Alabama Ethics Commission Recommendations, 23 ALA. L. REv. 369, 373 (1971): 
There is a growing belief that criminal statutes, and the whole legal appara-
tus that must be called into play to enforce and give vitality to such 
[conflict of interest] statutes may be incapable of coping with the complexity 
and subtlety of conflict of interest situations. • . . [I]t is virtually impossible 
to specifically define every legislative conflict of interest that may conceivably 
arise. 
Other commentators are more optimistic. Even the vague definition of conflicts of 
interest in the Code of Ethics of Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), was viewed as a breakthrough of sorts in Krasnow & Lank-
ford, supra note 79, at 277. 
159. It has been argued that overly stringent conflict of interest restrictions place 
an unconstitutional burden on the right to marry. See Note, supra note 120, at 756-
58. Another possible constitutional challenge-based on equal protection-focuses 
on the right to work, since statutes might unnecessarily circumscribe the career of 
a young professional. See id. at 758-59. Yet another argument asserts that the re-
strictions create an unconstitutional conclusive presumption about the ethical nature 
of the husband-wife employment. See id. at 761-64. 
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nuances of the problem requires rejection of this regulatory method. 
A fifth regulatory scheme, which would be designed to avoid the 
rigidity of a statutory plan, would be based on a code of ethics160 
or code of conduct to be enforced by internal ethics committees in 
each house of Congress. Both the House and the Senate now 
employ this method of regulation.161 The lack of rigidity in this type 
of plan has led to frequent criticism that such codes are by nature 
too vague.162 However, by approaching the provisions in the same 
sense as professional canons to be interpreted by an authoritative 
group to which the officeholder can submit questions,168 a code could 
establish reasonably specific standards.164 The problem with this 
approach is not with the standards but rather with the enforcement. 
Placing the regulatory responsibility on an internal legislative com-
mittee creates what has been called "the conflict within the conflict 
of interest laws,"165 a reference to the unwillingness and perhaps in-
capacity of legislators to enforce their own rules of ethical be-
havior. 166 So long as public confidence in the integrity of legislators 
remains low, 167 this approach has little to recommend it.168 
160. One code is found in H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
161. See S. Res. 338, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H. Res. 1013, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1966). 
162. See Note, supra note 53, at 453. 
163. See Note, The Federal Conflicts of Interest Statutes and the Fiduciary Prin.; 
ciple, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1507-08 (1961). 
164. Codes of ethics may be contained in statutes. Rhodes, Enforcement of 
Legislative Ethics: Conflict Within the Conflict of Interest Laws, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
373, 384 (1973). The congressional tendency, however, has been to approve ethical 
standards by legislative resolution. 
165. Id. at 381. 
166. Id. This phenomenon has been attributed to at least two behavioral patterns 
among legislators. Id. at 379-80. The first is legislative courtesy, a tendency to treat 
one's colleagues with considerable deference. D. MATI"HEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND 
THEIR WORLD 97-99 (1960). The second is legislative reciprocity, a policy of mutual 
assistance among colleagues. Id. at 100. 
The hesitancy to enforce legislative ethical regulations was noted some years ago. 
See G. GRAHAM, MORALITY IN .AMERICAN PoLmcs 82-% (1952); H. WILSON, CON-
GRESS: CORRUPTION AND COMPROMISE 1-12 (1951). This hesitancy continues to-
day. The July 1976 reprimand of Rep. Robert Sikes (D.-Fla.) was the first dis-
ciplinary action against a House member by the House Ethics Committee since 1969. 
The last major investigation of a Senate member by the Senate Ethics Committee was 
the 1967 review of the activities of Sen. Thomas Dodd (D.-Conn.). See also note 
158 supra. 
167. In a recent nationwide Lou Harris survey commissioned through the House 
Commission on Administrative Review, only 22 per cent of those surveyed gave Con-
gress a favorable rating, while 64 per cent gave it an unfavorable rating. In the sur-
vey's review of perceived ethical standards, those polled rated Congress below con-
sumer action groups, television newscasters, the White House, governors, state legis-
lators, farm organizations, and local government officials. Only corporation execu-
tives and organized labor received lower ethical ratings. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1977, 
§ A, at 11, col. 1. 
168. Since a major objective of conflict of interest legislation is the maintenance 
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Combining the flexibility of the code of ethics system with a 
different enforcement mechanism yields the most promising solution 
to the problem of regulating conflicts of interest. Under this 
scheme, enforcement would be placed in an independent ethics com-
mission authorized to respond to all potential conflict situations.100 
The commission would, of course, conduct hearings in order to de-
termine the propriety of a specific legislator's activities.170 More im-
portant, it would monitor various disclosure documents detailing the 
activities of members of Congress and their spouses171 in order to 
identify potential conflicts before any actual impropriety occurs or 
public confidence is affected.172 Although some guidance for the 
commission's decisionmaking could be provided in the code itself or 
in the enabling legislation for the commission, probably the best sys-
tem would allow the issuance of formal opinions, or even rules, 173 
to serve as standards for the future activities of public officials.174 
This approach is superior to the regulatory plans previously 
considered for dealing with congressional conflict of interest in the 
context of marriage. The code and the "collection of ethical prin-
ciples"175 generated by the commission would provide specific stan-
dards by which the general public, as well as those directly affected, 
could measure ethical performance. Questions from members of 
Congress could be resolved by advisory opinions.176 Because a case-
by-case method would be used, there would be less danger of a 
chilling effect on activities, the major drawback of the statutory 
approach. The individual attention given to each member of Con-
of public confidence, self-regulation by a body in which the public has little confi-
dence would not be productive. 
169. Several sources have suggested this approach. See Note, supra note 51, at 
1231; Note, supra note 53, at 457-58. One commentator has called the concept of 
the independent commission the "most promising" enforcement tool at the state level. 
Rhodes, supra note 164, at 392. He has suggested that the commission should be 
composed of both legislators and nonlegislators. Id. at 396-97. 
An independent congressional ethics commission was proposed as early as 1951. 
. S. Con. Res. 21, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. REC, 2938 (1951), proposed the 
formation of an independent advisory commission on ethics in the federal govern-
ment. 
170. See Note, supra note 53, at 457. 
171. These financial disclosure documents are discussed in notes 101-13 supra 
and accompanying text. 
172. See Note, supra note 51, at 1232. 
173. Id. 
174. Note, supra note 53, at 457. Because there are a myriad of potential marital 
employment combinations, each having a very different impact on conflict of interest 
considerations, standards of conflict of interest should be developed by the commis-
sion rather than be set out in detail in the statute or code. Empowering the commis• 
sion to give advisory opinions and make rules would eliminate any problems of fair 
notice caused by the statute's lack of specific definitions of unethical activity. 
175. Id. 
176. For an explanation of the current use of advisory opinions, see note 182 
infra. 
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gress would help define and detect more subtle conflicts, which now 
escape notice.177 Consistency of action-a major goal of any regu-
latory plan-should result from the use of the same group of regula-
tors to review every potential conflict over a period of time. Be-
cause of its superior efficacy, as well as its primary characteristic of 
freedom from political influence, one commentator has viewed the 
independent ethics commission as providing the "strongest potential 
for impartial and objective administration of legislative codes of 
ethics."178 
Because of its relative freedom from influence, the independent 
commission approach would also resolve a major problem found in 
Congress' current internal regulation procedure. At present, both 
houses of Congress require considerable public financial disclosure 
by members and their spouses.179 At the same time, ethical pro-
nouncements beyond the vague standards articulated in the codes 
of conduct of both houses are generally derived from case-by-case 
review by the ethics committees.180 There is grave danger in this 
arrangement. As previously noted, 181 these internal ethics panels 
have been exceedingly hesitant to act.182 If this pattern continues, 
much information will be made available to the public with little ac-
companying analysis from the committee on whether ethical stan-
dards have been violated. Absent this analysis, much of the newly 
disclosed information will make spouses of members of Congress 
177. See Note, supra note 53, at 458. The incompatible-office cases use a similar 
case-by-case approach. See, e.g., Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 265, 148 A. 434, 436 
(1930). 
178. Rhodes, supra note 164, at 396. 
179. See notes 101-13 supra and accompanying text. 
180. The Senate's Select Committee on Ethics, however, is now "authorized to 
issue interpretative rulings explaining and clarifying the application of any law, the 
Code of Official Conduct, or any rule or regulation of the Senate within its jurisdic-
tion." S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1977). In light of its traditional 
hesitancy to act, see note 166 and accompanying text, it is unclear whether the com-
mittee will avail itself of this power. 
181. See note 166 supra and accompanying text. 
182. In fairness, it must be noted that Congress has attempted to remedy this 
problem. For example, the Senate's ethics committee now must render "an advisory 
opinion, in writing within a reasonable time, in response to a written requst" by a 
Senate member "concerning the application of any law, the Senate Code of Official 
Conduct, or any rule or regulation of the Senate within its jurisdiction to a specific 
factual situation pertinent to the conduct of proposed conduct of the person seeking 
the advisory opinion." The advisory opinion is to be published in the Congres-
sional Record, though the identity of the person who requested the opinion is to be 
kept confidential. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1977). However, in 
spite of these provisions for confidentiality, members of Congress will probably not 
desire to subject themselves to scrutiny by their colleagues. Thus, it is not clear 
whether the advisory-opinion procedures as utilized by the internal ethics panel will 
be at all effective in promoting the regulation of conflicts of interest. 
1680 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1647 
quite vulnerable to a standard.less "trial by press. "188 The independ-
ent commission would be less hesitant to provide the analysis neces-
sary to vindicate society's interest in regulating conflicts of interest. 
Furthermore, the independent commission appears to be the 
most responsive body to the changing societal view of the mar-
riage relationship and of the evolving independence of marital part-
ners. Many of the current societal conclusions regarding the 
dangers of conflict situations resulting from marriage are based on 
a belief that the relationship entails a degree of interdependence that 
impairs the judgment of the persons involved.184 Although this view 
seems to describe accurately many marriages today, it is undesirable 
to create inflexible restrictions tailored to current views that might 
be eroding rapidly.185 Of all the institutions discussed in this Note 
as potential regulators of conflicts of interest, the independent com-
mission, as an administrative body with an adequate staff, is in the 
best position to make accurate judgments on this type of rapidly 
evolving social issue. 
It may be that changing mores about the independence of spouses 
make regulation of marital conflicts of interest less necessary. On 
the other hand, the increasing tendency for both spouses to be 
employed creates more potential conflicts of interest that need 
analysis by a body charged with upholding the public interest. In 
any event, although Congress has recognized the need for conflicts 
of interest regulation in the context of marriage, the modes of regula-
tion adopted by each house are clearly inadequate to deal with this 
complex issue effectively. 
183. See note 149 supra and accompanying text. 
As previously noted, see text at note 116 supra, the congressional decision to limit 
ethics regulation largely to just financial disclosure may have been a compromise be-
tween the desire for stringent conflicts regulation and the increasing recognition of 
the autonomy of marital partners. In reality, however, the failure to regulate seem• 
ingly unethical activities by members of Congress may result in greater restraints on 
the conduct of members and their spouses because of the fear of a "trial by press" 
for any questionable activities. In this manner, the compromise may create a formid-
able, unintended restraint on spousal activity. 
184. So long as the public perceives the marital relationship as being sufficiently 
close to create possible conflicts of interest, corrective regulation may be needed even 
where the actual danger of unethical behavior is small, since one purpose of such 
regulation is to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 
185. See The American Family, supra note 1, at 35. 
